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Abstract 
This paper gives an overview over how far transition has proceeded and what is still lacking in 
the process. The analytical framework – the PIE model for Politics, Institutions, Economy – is 
introduced. The model is first used to point to the main reasons for the fall of the command 
economy. Then it is used to identify the barriers for transition of the institutional system and the 
restructuring of the economy. This includes an analysis of the different factors behind the steep 
fall in production in the first years of transition. It is shown that countries implementing a tough 
stabilization and a comprehensive and consequent liberalization have been most successful in the 
process. A fast and comprehensive privatization, on the other hand, has not been sufficient for the 
necessary restructuring of enterprises. Decisive for success in transition has been transformation 
of the state as a crucial part of the development of new political and economic institutions 
implementing well functioning, clear and stable rules of the game for private enterprises. The 
institutional development has been important for the attractiveness of foreign investments - 
important for restructuring enterprises as part of a positive circle for the transition process. 
 
1. Introduction - some key questions 
The transition in Eastern Europe (including the former Soviet Union) has been much more 
difficult than expected both by experts and the population. Why has transition been so difficult?  
Why did production fall steeply in the first years of the transition process? These questions will 
be answered in the following. It will be shown that countries implementing a tough stabilization 
and a comprehensive and consequent liberalization have been most successful in the process. A 
fast and comprehensive privatization, on the other hand, has not been sufficient for the necessary 
restructuring of enterprises. Decisive for success in transition has been transformation of the state 
as a crucial part of the development of new market institutions implementing well functioning, 
clear and stable rules of the game for the private enterprises. Building up the new structure of 
institutions is still in process in all transition economies, but there are huge differences in the 
stages of development. The front-runners are: The Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary and Poland 
closely followed by Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia. The institutional development has been im-
portant for the attractiveness of foreign investments and these FDI have been important for 
restructuring enterprises as part of a positive circle for the transition process.  
 
This paper gives an overview over how far transition has proceeded and what is still lacking in 
the process. First the PIE-framework is shortly introduced. Then the barriers for transition will be 
identified. This includes an analysis of the different factors behind the steep fall in production in 
the first years of transition. Then, a short discussion follows of the necessary policies of 
stabilization, liberalization and privatization. The effect of the current financial crisis on the 
countries in transition is analyzed. The importance of a well functioning state will be emphasized 
and it will be explained how international cooperation and FDI have had great impact on the 
development in some of the frontrunner countries.  
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2. The PIE model: Politics – Institutions – Economy 
This model has been developed as a simple model for dynamic analysis of societal change and to 
describe the business environment in a given society (see Mygind 2007) – It has also been used 
as an analytical tool for analyzing the growth prospects in China (Mygind 2008).  
 
Human beings devise institutions as constraints on human behavior to shape human interaction 
(North 1990). The political and economic institutions of a society define the rules of the game for 
its citizens. In recent years, it has been widely recognized that high institutional quality is a main 
driver for growth and high per capita GDP (IMF 2005, Porter and Schwab 2008). This is the 
reason why institutions – both formal and informal – are included as a main box in the model of 
society given below (see Mygind, 2007 for further details). The political institutions define the 
rules for how the political system functions through the constitution. The economic institutions 
set the framework for the rules of the game in the economy. The informal institutions in the 
culture set unwritten rules both for politics and for the economy. The change of formal 
institutions is done through the political process – thus, arrows point in both directions between 
politics and institutions. 
 
The political process is based on the distribution of power, income, and resources to the citizens. 
Citizens can be divided into different social groups in relation to this distribution. Different 
cultures can also play a role e.g. in relation to different ethnic or religious groupings so there is 
also a connection between informal institutions and social groups. 
 
Figure 1 – Dynamics of the PIE-Model: Politics – Institutions – Economy 
 
Politics 
power game between parties,  
government, presidency etc. 
 
Social groups 
distribution of: 
power, income, resources 
alliances/conflicts
Economy 
flows: growth, investment, inflation etc 
economic policies, stabilization 
markets 
 Resources (stocks) 
Created: human, infrastructure, 
production structure, technology 
Natural resources, geography 
Institutions 
Political institutions: 
constitution, human rights 
Economic institutions: 
rules of the game, plan/market 
property rights, regulation etc. 
 
Informal institutions (culture) 
values, religion 
norms, preferences 
social trust
Surrounding world 
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The economy is divided in two parts: flow variables, such as GDP, investments, consumption, 
inflation etc.; and stock variables, such as human resources (i.e. size and quality of the 
workforce), capital equipment in the production structure, technological quality of this capital, 
infrastructure, natural resources and geography. The economy is strongly influenced both by the 
economic institutions and by the decisions for economic policy determined in the political 
process. At the same time, the economy lays the foundation for distribution between different 
social groups. The level of development in the economy also feeds back to the development of 
institutions. Therefore, Figure 1 includes arrows in both directions between the economy and the 
boxes of politics and institutions.  
 
Finally, it is important to include the influence from the surrounding world on all three boxes: 
International coercion and alliances influence politics. International pressure, benchmarks, and 
supervision influence institutions. International interaction through trade, FDI, and other types of 
economic cooperation strongly influences the economy.  
 
The different links in the model have different weights depending on the specific analysis, as 
exemplified in the following section. 
 
2. Background – why did the command economies break down? 
We can make a short analysis of the break down of the command economies by using the PIE-
framework (for a deeper analysis, see Mygind 1994 ch. 5): 
 
Figure 2 – Factors behind the break down of the command economy 
 
Politics 
centralization, monopolization of power 
no organized opposition as corrective 
mechanism, petrification of elite 
 Social groups 
no social dynamics, apathy 
high income equality, but high 
power and consumption inequality
Economy 
possibility of extensive growth, basic 
industrialization, rebuilding after war 
but intensive growth needed for 
complex and dynamic production 
falling growth, monetary overhang,  
Resources  
High supply of natural and human 
resources, but low productivity, 
meet resource barrier=>low growth
Institutions 
Political institutions: dictatorship 
suppression of human rights 
Economic institutions: 
Planning: principal agent problems 
bargaining game between levels 
prices not related to costs and demand 
no incentives for innovation, risk taking 
Informal institutions (culture) 
gap between ideology and reality 
low social solidarity, low motivation 
distortion of information => - plan
Surrounding world 
Increased pressure through media, 
Increased technological gap 
Arms race, increased military burden 
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The core of the problem is to be found in the institutional system. Decision-making were 
centralized in the planning-bureaucracy which send directives to the enterprises. In the ideal 
model these decisions would be based on detailed and correct information from the enterprises. 
The plan would reflect this information and the preferences of the customers, and finally the 
firms would in a loyal way follow the directives from the center. However, the reality turned out 
to be completely different. The information flow was distorted first of all because enterprises 
when reporting to the top had an interest to exaggerate their need of inputs and underscore their 
production possibilities. In this way they would get an easy plan for the next period. There were 
conflicting interest not only between enterprises and planners, but also within different sectors 
and ministries – so the whole process is a classical principal-agent situation with asymmetric 
information. It was a negotiation game based on distorted information and conflicts of interests. It 
may be argued that for simple choices in relation to the basic industrialization process – such as 
building up the electrification of the Soviet Union – the system functioned to some extent. 
However, in the dynamic and complex economy of the 1970es and 1980es – this kind of central 
planning with conflicting interests between different levels had increasing problems. 
 
The problems were intensified because of the rigid political institutions where the communist 
party had the monopoly of power. In this dictatorship there was no organized opposition and no 
critical press who could point to the deficiencies in the system, criticize abuse of power and 
corruption and suggest alternatives to improve the institutions. Thus, the system lacked effective 
corrective mechanisms and lost its dynamics. There was no drive from the political system for 
institutional change. Attempt of reforms were in the Soviet Union stopped within the system and 
the same happened in most of the Soviet controlled East European countries in some cases after 
direct military intervention from the Soviet Union like in Hungary 1956 or Czechoslovakia in 
1968. An important exception was the former Yugoslavia where especially the northern parts – 
now Slovenia and Croatia – introduced reforms with market orientation already from the 1960es. 
 
In spite of hard suppression many basic cultural element e.g. connected to religion survived in the 
informal institutions. The strong Catholic Churches in Poland and Lithuania are good examples. 
The communist party tried to develop a new culture – to create the communist man. But instead 
there was an increasing gap between the official ideology about solidarity, social consciousness, 
and equality and the reality of people working for their own individual interest and the actual 
inequality between the elite of leaders with power and high consumption possibilities and the 
broad group of people without influence and personal freedom and relatively low material 
standard of living.  
 
Citizens in East Germany could contrast their substandard living conditions with relatives in 
West Germany, and Estonians who before the Soviet Occupation had a standard of living higher 
than their Finnish counterpart could see their level falling much behind the prosperous northern 
neighbor. This kind of benchmarking was part of the pressure from the surrounding world which 
was part of the social background for the break down of the command economies. IT-technology 
and new mass media decreased the possibility for censuring information from the rest of the 
world. At the same time there was a military competition in the cold war which forced the Soviet 
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camp to use a huge proportion of their scarce resources for rearmament. The best quality of 
goods, researchers, workers etc. went into military production and increasingly starved the rest of 
the economy. The economic problems meant that even the conservative parts of the party 
connected to the military and the military-industrial complex had to face the need for some 
deeper institutional change – and thus, their resistance against reforms was weakened.  
 
The pressure from the outside world explains part of the timing for the fall of the command 
system. However, another factor connected to the economy must be emphasized. The command 
economy could to some extent work in a world of simple technological and economic choices 
like the basic industrialization process in the 1930es (Do not take this as a defense of Stalin’s 
brutal collectivization of the Soviet agriculture which caused millions of lives) and the fast 
rebuilding of Soviet after the second world war. It was possible to make extensive growth where 
free resources of labor were moved from unemployment or low productive agriculture to 
industry. The plan could handle building one power station, then ten and then hundreds and 
electrify the country. In this way the plan could mobilize the resources not only of labor, but also 
of raw materials in the world’s most resource rich country. However, the extensive growth started 
to meet its limits in the 1960es and this explains the lower growth rates in the 1970es and the 
stagnation in the 1980es. The marginal cost of extracting an extra barrel of oil or an extra ton of 
metal increased. Also, most of the labor reserve was employed – agriculture made up a smaller 
proportion of the population and most women were employed. The increase in productivity could 
not be based on adding more resources to industry. The only way was to use the existing 
resources more effectively – that is through intensive growth. However, this type of growth based 
on innovations, higher motivation, and improved organization needed an institutional framework 
which could function with complexity and foster dynamic changes. Such a framework should be 
built on decentralization and flexibility – institutions which characterize the market mechanism.  
 
In short the stagnation was caused by the rigidity of the institutions of the command economy 
which hindered the change to intensive growth – that is the economic institutions connected to 
central planning. However, the petrification of the society was also strongly connected to the 
political institutions with the monopoly of power to the communist party. This rigid power 
structure hindered for many years the change of economic institutions. The early attempt for 
change in Eastern Europe was stopped brutally by the Soviet forces. The former Yugoslavia 
could make an exception because it was not under the control of Soviet Union. However, at a 
certain point the need of change was so strong even within the Soviet Union that the reform- 
minded Gorbatjov came to power. He started first a gradual attempt of economic reforms 
(Uskarenie) acceleration. However without change in the power structure the intended 
decentralization did not succeed. Instead he started the policy of Perestrojka (transformation), 
including Glasnost (openness) and Demokratisatsia. This included an opening of criticism of the 
traditional command model and started a gradual change of the political structure in democratic 
direction. It also implied that new reform tendencies first in Poland and Hungary were not met by 
the earlier veto from Soviet – instead the conservative Honecker in DDR was criticized by 
Gorbatjov for not joining the train of reforms. In 1989 a wave of reforms spread from Poland and 
Hungary to include all East European countries. The Iron Wall fell and in the following years the 
move went also inside the Soviet Union with democratic elections in each of the republics. An 
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attempt from conservative forces of stopping this movement in August 1991 failed and instead 
the process was accelerated and led to the dissolution of the Soviet Union. (See Mygind 1994 ch. 
7, for a more detailed description of these revolutionary changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet 
Union). 
 
This process is an example of how a small change in the political institutions led to a change in 
the power structure in the political system which again led to further democratic reforms in the 
political institutions. At the same time it is an example of interaction between different countries 
within the Eastern European bloc.  
 
3. Barriers for transition 
The political revolutions 1989-91 in the Eastern Europe marked the start of comprehensive 
transitions of the economic institutions from command to market mechanism and a transition of 
the economy with fundamental restructuring of production. The transition also included the 
creation and development of new democratic political institutions with new rules of the game for 
politics and a cultural liberation with deep changes in the informal institutions of habits, norms 
and values (Mygind 1994, ch. 6).  
 
3.1.  Barriers in the economy – the J-curve as explanation of the fall in production 
The dissolution of the old system, the breaking up of most economic networks between 
enterprises and between countries and steep cuts in production took place in a rather short period. 
On the other hand, building up new links, new products, and new production methods demanded 
huge resources - time, capital and human qualifications. Lack of these resources caused 
bottlenecks for the transition process. 
 
Niels Mygind, CEES, CBS
Figure 3 - The production J-curve
high growth
deep
restructuring:
new enterprises
new products
new production-
methods
new markets
time
Early
transition
steep fall in 
production
reactive
restructuring
 
 
Before transition, production was determined by direct orders from central planners. In a market 
system it is the demand by the customers and market based costs, which determine what 
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enterprises shall produce. Calculations for the early stage of transition based on world market 
prices showed that around one third of production had a negative value added. In these 
enterprises the value of inputs such as oil and other raw materials were higher than the market 
value of outputs, which could only be sold at quite low prices. Labor and capital in these 
enterprises were not used for production, but destruction! (Hare and Hughes, 1992). The other 
two thirds of production were either produced with losses or with a very low return on assets. The 
transition to world market prices meant that much of the huge physical capital stock and much of 
the human capital built up in the command economy turned out to be of very low value measured 
with the world market as benchmark. 
 
Adjustment to market conditions resulted in a drastic fall of production and after a period also a 
reactive restructuring with cuts in employment in the old industrial enterprises. Employment was 
cut much faster in Central Europe compared with CIS-countries (Commonwealth of Independent 
States covering the former Soviet Union minus the Baltic countries) where the workers stayed in 
the large failing industrial enterprises although they had cut down most of the production. All 
over Eastern Europe labor productivity fell in the first years of transition. The turnaround based 
on cuts in employment happened earlier in Central Europe compared to the CIS countries (EBRD 
1999, World Bank 1996, for more details on the J-curve see also Mygind 1994, ch. 8). 
 
 
Table 1 - Growth in GDP 1989-2009 
 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2009
         1989=100
Albania 9.8 -10.0 -28.0 -7.2 9.6 8.3 13.3 9.1 -10.9 8.6 13.2 *6.5 7.1 4.3 5.7 6.7 5.5 5.5 6.0 7.8 3.3 170.3
Belarus 8.0 -3.0 -1.2 -9.6 -7.6 -12.6 -10.4 2.8 11.4 8.4 3.4 5.8 4.7 5.0 *7.0 11.4 9.4 9.9 8.5 9.9 0.5 160.3
Bulgaria 0.5 -9.1 -11.7 -7.3 -1.5 1.8 2.9 -9.4 -5.6 4.0 2.3 5.4 4.1 4.5 5.0 6.6 6.2 *6.1 6.2 6.2 -4.9 108.6
Croatia -1.6 -7.1 -21.1 -11.7 -8.0 5.9 6.8 6.0 6.5 2.5 -0.9 2.9 4.4 5.6 5.3 4.3 *4.3 4.8 5.6 2.4 -5.8 105.0
Czech R 1.4 -1.2 -11.6 -0.5 0.1 2.2 5.9 4.2 -0.7 -0.8 1.3 *3.6 2.5 1.9 3.6 4.6 6.5 6.8 6.0 2.7 -4.3 135.9
Estonia 8.1 -6.5 -13.6 -14.2 -8.8 -1.6 4.5 4.4 11.1 4.4 0.3 10.8 7.7 *8.0 7.1 8.1 10.5 10.4 6.3 -5.1 -13.9 125.1
Hungary 0.7 -3.5 -11.9 -3.1 -0.6 2.9 1.5 1.3 4.6 4.9 4.2 *5.2 4.1 4.4 4.2 4.8 4.1 4.1 1.1 0.8 -6.7 127.2
Latvia 6.8 2.9 -10.4 -34.9 -14.9 2.2 -0.9 3.8 8.3 4.7 3.3 8.4 8.0 6.5 7.2 8.5 *10.2 12.2 10.3 -4.2 -18.0 96.6
Lithuania 1.5 -5.0 -5.7 -21.3 -16.2 -9.8 3.3 4.7 7.0 7.3 -1.7 3.9 7.2 6.9 10.3 7.3 7.6 *7.8 8.9 2.9 -14.7 104.3
Poland 0.2 -11.6 -7.0 2.6 3.8 5.2 7.0 *6.2 7.1 5.0 4.5 4.3 1.2 1.4 3.9 5.3 3.6 6.2 6.6 5.1 1.7 180.9
Romania -5.8 -5.6 -12.9 -8.8 1.5 3.9 7.1 4.0 -6.1 -4.8 -1.1 2.1 5.7 5.1 5.2 *8.5 4.1 7.9 6.0 7.3 -7.1 119.7
Russia 0.0 0.0 -5.0 -14.8 -8.7 -12.7 -4.0 -3.6 1.4 -5.3 6.4 10.0 5.1 4.7 7.3 7.1 6.4 7.4 *8.1 5.3 -7.9 101.7
Slovakia 1.4 -2.5 -15.9 -6.7 -3.7 6.2 5.8 6.1 4.6 4.2 1.5 2.0 *3.2 4.1 4.2 5.4 6.0 8.5 10.4 5.8 -4.8 152.0
Slovenia -1.8 -7.5 -8.9 -5.5 2.8 5.3 4.1 3.7 4.8 *3.9 5.4 4.1 3.1 3.7 2.8 4.4 4.1 5.9 6.8 3.7 -8.1 144.4
Ukraine 4.0 -4.0 -10.6 -9.7 -14.2 -22.9 -12.2 -10.0 -3.0 -1.9 -0.2 5.9 9.2 5.2 9.4 12.1 2.6 7.3 7.6 2.3 -14.8 59.6
Based on EBRD-2008 and 2010. The year when passing the start level marked by * 
 
The deep strategic restructuring with development of new products, access to new markets and 
introduction of new organizational structures and production methods in the enterprises is a much 
more long term and resource-intensive process. It is much easier and faster to cut production and 
9 
 
employment than to build up new systems which need capital, technological and management 
expertise as well as developed market institutions. Therefore, the result was a steep fall in 
production followed by a slow, but in the successful transitional economies, accelerating 
recovery of production.  
 
There have been important differences in how fast each transitional country has turned around. 
Poland was the first to show positive growth. In 1996 Poland passed the 1989-production level 
marked by * in table 1. Slovenia passed the starting point in 1998. Albania, the Czech Republic 
and Hungary passed the point in 2000; Slovakia in 2001; Estonia in 2002; Belarus in 2003, 
Romania in 2004; Croatia and Latvia and 2005; Bulgaria and Lithuania in 2006; and Russia in 
2007. Ukraine still has some years to go. A weighted average for Central and Eastern Europe 
including the Baltic Countries shows that the 1989 level was passed in 2000 (EBRD 2000). The 
2009 production level for Ukraine is only 60% of the 1989 level, see Table 1. The level for 
Belarus is somewhat misleading. It is still to a high degree a command economy. If the 
Belarusian growth is measured in USD the index ends up to be only around 50% of the 1989 
level, while the Baltic countries have levels of GDP per capita in USD around the double of this. 
 
3.2 Barriers for political change 
The barriers for the development of the new political system can be found in the risk that the old 
elite converts its political power to new forms in the new system, and in the lack of democratic 
traditions and experience. An important barrier is the overwhelming task of consolidating the 
democratic institutions in a period where new legislation is needed in almost all areas. Many 
political decisions must be made without knowing the effects of the policies because of the high 
uncertainty in the early transition. It is impossible to implement the full market model in one step. 
In most areas a long transitional period will be dominated by “half solutions” leaving a lot of 
holes to be exploited by corrupt elements. The uncertainty in the political system is an important 
reason why it took many years to develop stable political parties, because it is difficult to develop 
and implement stable political programs in an unstable environment. (Mygind 1994, ch. 6) 
 
3.3 Barriers for change of informal institutions (culture) 
The barriers for the cultural transition can be divided in two main types. The dissolution of the 
rigid Soviet system meant that the deep cultural values, that had been suppressed now flourished 
again. Religion and national consciousness regained importance in many countries. Many of the 
conflicts cooled down in the Soviet system were unfrozen, and in some areas conflicts heated up 
further and exploded in ethnic religious wars. Such conflicts seriously delayed the transition 
process in Caucasus and in the former Yugoslavia. 
 
Norms and routines from the command economies have prevailed for many groups. Especially 
the older generations have problems understanding and following the wave of drastic changes. 
On the other hand the transition gives a lot of opportunities, especially for young people. 
Therefore, the gap between generations has deepened in many countries of transition. Especially, 
in the CIS-countries without a positive collective consciousness about the time before the 
command economy, there is strong inertia concerning the change of norms and habits. This is a 
main barrier for the development of the new market economy. 
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Figure 4 – Barriers for transition 
 
 
 
3.4 Barriers and elements of the change of Economic institutions 
Ideally, the transition of economic institutions should be made in one step. With the exception of 
GDR, which was taken over by BRD and rapidly enrolled in the German institutional system, it is 
not possible to implement a real “big bang”. Even in countries performing a tough economic 
shock therapy like Poland and Estonia there is still something missing in building up and 
implementing all the necessary market institutions.  
 
The key elements in a market economy are: market based prices as information signals and 
private ownership with decentralized control and decentralized incentives for the owners. There 
must be direct correspondence between the right to control and the financial rights to returns and 
capital gains. The implementation of these elements is done through stabilization, liberalization 
and privatization. This will be further developed in the next three sections. 
 
 
4. The necessity of stabilization  
In all the command economies there was a “monetary overhang” because of constant prices 
combined with unbalanced expansion of purchasing power. This overhang was reflected in 
excess demand of goods. Queues and empty shops were not signs of too low production. They 
were signs of too low prices in relation to purchasing power. To implement the market 
Politics 
overloaded political system, unstable 
parties, unclear rules of the game 
 
Social groups 
old elite converts political power to 
economic power through networks, 
ethnic/religious conflicts unfrozen
Economy 
monetary overhang + lib. => inflation, 
deep restructuring of production 
needed to adjust to costs and demand  
Resources  
lack of: capital for new technology 
new skills: management, initiative 
new networks: markets, int. relations 
time => bottlenecks, unemployment 
Institutions 
Political institutions: 
difficult choices on new constitution 
Economic institutions: old elite benefits 
from halfhearted liberalization, 
privatization problems: distribution, 
lack of: information, capital, institutions  
Impossible to introduce the whole 
package in one step => loopholes 
 
Informal institutions (culture) 
Change of habits: + young, -old 
Break down of old norms=>vacuum 
Depletion of social capital / trust => 
problems of filling gaps in formal 
institutions
Surrounding world 
reluctant in the start of transition 
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mechanism the prices were liberalized in the start of transition. In countries with a huge monetary 
overhang the result was an explosion in prices. Hungary, which already had market oriented 
prices in the 1980es had only small price increases in 1990, see Table 2, while price liberalization 
in Russia in January 1992 resulted in a 300% jump in prices during only one month. 
 
Table 2 - Inflation 1990-2008 (consumer prices, change in annual average) 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Albania 0.0 35.5 226 85 23 7.8 12.7 33.2 20.6 0.4 0.1 3.1 5.2 2.4 2.9 2.4 2.4 2.9 4.0 2.3
Belarus 4.7 94.1 971 1190 2221 709 52.7 63.8 73.2 294 169 61.4 42.6 28.4 18.1 10.3 7.0 8.4 15.3  13.0
Bulgaria 26.3 334 82 73 96 62 123 1082 22.2 0.7 9.9 7.4 5.9 2.3 6.1 5.0 7.3 8.4 12.4 2.5
Croatia 610 123 666 1518 98 2.0 3.5 3.6 5.7 4.2 6.2 4.9 2.2 1.8 2.1 3.3 3.2 2.9 6.5 2.4
Czech R. 9.7 52 11 21 10 9.1 8.8 8.5 10.7 2.1 3.9 4.7 1.8 0.2 2.8 1.9 2.5 2.8 6.3
Estonia 23.1 211 1076 90 48 29 23.1 11.2 8.1 3.3 4.0 5.8 3.6 1.3 3.0 4.1 4.4 6.6 10.7 -0.1
Hungary 28.9 35.0 23 23 19 28 23.6 18.3 14.3 10.0 9.8 9.2 4.8 4.9 6.8 3.6 3.9 8.0 6.3 4.2
Latvia 10.5 172 951 109 36 25 25.0 17.6 8.4 4.7 2.4 2.6 2.5 1.9 2.9 6.2 6.5 10.1 15.8 3.5
Lithuania 8.4 225 1021 410 72 40 24.6 8.9 5.1 0.8 1.0 1.3 0.3 -1.2 1.2 2.7 3.8 5.7 11.1 4.5
Poland 586 70 43 35 32 28 19.9 14.9 11.8 7.3 10.1 5.5 1.7 0.7 3.5 2.2 1.2 2.5 4.3 3.8
Romania 5.1 170 210 256 137 32 38.8 155 59.1 45.8 45.7 34.5 22.5 15.3 11.9 9.5 6.9 4.8 7.2 5.6
Russia 5.6 93 1526 875 311 198 47.8 14.7 27.6 86.1 20.8 21.6 15.7 13.7 10.9 12.7 9.7 9.0 13.0 11.7
Slovakia 10.8 61 10 23 13 9.9 5.8 6.1 6.7 10.6 12.0 7.1 3.3 8.5 7.5 2.7 4.5 2.8 4.3 1.6
Slovenia 550 118 207 33 21 14 9.9 8.4 7.9 6.1 8.9 8.4 7.5 5.6 3.6 2.5 2.5 3.6 6.1 0.9
Ukraine 4.2 91 1210 4734 891 377 80.0 15.9 10.5 22.7 28.2 12.0 0.8 5.2 9.0 13.5 9.1 12.8 24.8 15.9
Based on EBRD-2010 
 
High and persistent inflation means that the price system sends uncertain signals. The functioning 
of the decentralized information system and thus the market mechanism is hampered. This is the 
main reason why stabilization of prices is important. In countries such as Russia and Ukraine too 
lax economic policy in the first half of the 1990s resulted in a spiral of price increases combined 
with increasing nominal wages, continued depreciation of the currency, expansion of the 
monetary supply and soft credits to enterprises. High inflation continued for several years. The 
Central European countries, on the contrary, implemented tough stabilization policies. This also 
happened a few years later in the Baltic countries. From Table 2 it can be seen that inflation in 
these countries fell under the critical level of 40-50% by 1994/95. At this time inflation was still 
very high in Bulgaria, Romania and the CIS countries. However, through tightening of monetary 
policy and currency policy with a rather stable exchange rate Russia and most other CIS countries 
succeeded in stabilizing inflation from 1995. The financial crisis in Russia in August 1998 gave 
another push to inflation, but the following tough stabilization policy resulted in lower inflation 
levels, which have not seriously hampered the functioning of the market mechanism.  
 
With the Russian crisis there was a backlash in demand, which limited both growth and inflation 
in most transitional economies in 1998 and 1999. In the later years inflation has been quite low in 
Central- and Eastern Europe although with some upward pressure in 2007 and 2008 because of 
increasing energy and food prices. With relatively fixed exchange rates and an increase in 
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productivity this leaves room for a real appreciation. In the long run inflation can be a bit higher 
than the inflation for the most important trading partners - the old members of EU. However, the 
financial crisis with a steep fall in demand meant a temporary fall in inflation (see section 11). 
 
Comparing Tables 1 and 2 there is a clear connection between lower inflation and growth in 
production. Countries with fast and consequent stabilization and controlled inflation had, after a 
few years, growth in production while the fall in production continued for several years in the 
CIS countries with postponed stabilization. The accession to EU is another element putting 
pressure on inflation in the frontrunner transition countries. However, increasing excise taxes 
meant a slight increase in prices in the accession year 2004. With exchange rate fixed to the Euro 
and a fast catching up of productivity and GDP-levels the Baltic countries will also have a 
catching up of price levels. In the long trend perspective of the catching up process this may 
result in an inflation level about 3% higher than the inflation in the Euro-area (see Mygind 2006). 
This means that the countries with fixed currencies will not be able to fulfill the Euro access-
criteria unless they for some years implement tough policies with relatively low growth – see 
further the discussion on the effects of the 2008-09 financial crisis in section 11. 
 
5. The necessity of liberalization - status for implementation 
Liberalization - deregulation through transfer of control and incentives from the state to private 
decentralized units - is an important element of developing the market mechanism. Successful 
liberalization also means stable and clear rules of the game for private enterprises and institutions 
monitoring competition and securing a level playing field.  
 
Price liberalization (except for specific areas such as energy, public transport and housing) was 
implemented rather fast in most countries. At the same time the frontrunners implemented a fast 
and comprehensive liberalization of foreign trade. This belongs to what the EBRD calls the first 
stage of reforms – market enabling reforms (EBRD 2008). 
 
The opportunity for establishing new private enterprises is also an important part of the market 
economy. However, it is not only important to create access to entry. It is also important to 
implement the possibility and clear rules for exit from the market. Therefore, a well functioning 
legal framework for bankruptcy is important. Exit means that non-performing assets are taken 
over by new owners, who will have the opportunity to make better use of these assets. If exits are 
blocked by soft credits and subsidies inefficient state supported enterprises can block the entrance 
of new and potentially more efficient enterprises.  
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Contrary to price-liberalization which was implemented rather fast and consequent in most 
countries, opening up for foreign competition showed more variation. Even larger differences 
could be found in the implementation of bankruptcy procedures. Countries such as Estonia and 
Hungary implemented tough procedures early in the process while countries such as the Czech 
Republic and Russia were more reluctantly implementing hard budget constraints for their 
enterprises. 
 
Table 3 - Status for liberalization 2010 
 Price 
liberalization
Liberalize 
foreign 
trade and   
exchange 
Compe-
tition 
Policy 
Bank reform 
liberalize  
interest rate 
Securities 
market and 
non-bank 
finance inst
Overall 
infrastruc-
ture reform 
Albania             4+  4+ 2 .             3 2 - 2+ 
Belarus 3+ 2+ 2 . 2+ 2 . 1 . 
Bulgaria 4+ 4+ 3 . 4 - 3 . 3 . 
Croatia 4 . 4+ 3 . 4 . 3 . 3 . 
Czech Rep 4+ 4+ 3 . 4 . 4 - 3+ 
Estonia 4+ 4+ 4 - 4 . 4 - 3+ 
Hungary 4+ 4+ 3+ 4 - 4 . 4 - 
Latvia 4+ 4+ 3 . 4 . 3 . 3 . 
Lithuania 4+ 4+ 3+ 4 - 3+ 3 . 
Poland 4+ 4+ 3 . 4 - 4 . 3+ 
Romania 4+ 4+ 3 . 3+ 3 . 3+ 
Russia 4 . 3+ 2+ 3 - 3 . 3 - 
Slovak R 4+ 4+ 3+ 4 - 3 - 3 + 
Slovenia 4 . 4+ 3 - 3+ 3 . 3 . 
Ukraine 4 . 4 . 2+ 3 . 3 - 2+ 
Based on EBRD-2010, index  from 1 (no liberalization) to 4+ (full liberalization) 
 
There is a strong connection between this part of liberalization and the development of market 
institutions related to the financial system, banks and the capital market, and to the development 
of institutions securing private property rights. This part of the liberalization process belongs to 
the second tier of institutional reforms, which takes much more time to implement. 
 
6. Privatization and corporate governance 
Privatization of enterprises is necessary for developing decentralized control and decentralized 
incentives such as financial ownership rights. The owners and managers need incentives to use 
resources efficiently. This is closely connected to the development of efficient corporate 
governance systems between owners, managers and other stakeholders related to the enterprise. 
 
However, it is difficult to implement privatization in transitional economies because many market 
institutions are not fully developed - a developed banking system, a well functioning stock 
market, reliable information about the economic situation of enterprises etc. It is very difficult to 
give a fair valuation of the assets because the markets are undeveloped and volatile with high 
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uncertainty about the future development. The population lacks information and lacks capital to 
buy the assets. The solution to the last problem has in countries like the Czech Republic, Russia 
and Lithuania been privatization through vouchers - privatization coupons freely distributed to 
the population. These vouchers were used for auctions of the enterprises to be privatized. 
Investment funds often played an important role in this process. In this way the problem of 
lacking capital was solved, and it was possible to have a high equality at least in the initial round 
of distribution of the assets.  
 
In other countries such as Estonia and Hungary the most important method of privatization was 
direct sale to the investor who could offer the best combination of price, and guarantees of future 
investment and employment. Direct sale favored capital owners, and especially foreign investors 
played an important role in countries using this method of privatization. In other countries such 
as Russia, Lithuania and Slovenia insiders, managers and other employees, had strong advantages 
for taking over their enterprises including large and medium sized enterprises. In other countries 
such insider takeovers were only frequent for small privatization - privatization of small 
enterprises and subsidiaries of larger enterprises. 
 
Table 4   Privatization status 2010 and method for large privatization  
 Private 
sector 
% of 
GDP 
Large
privatiza-
tion   (large 
enterprises) 
Small  
privatiza-
tion   (small
enterprises)
Governance
and  
enterprise 
restructuring
Primary
privatization 
method 
Secondary  
privati-
zation  
method 
Peak 
privati-
zation  
years 
Albania 75 4 - 4 . 2+ insider voucher 1995-96 
Belarus 30 2 - 2+ 2 - not privatized   
Bulgaria 75 4 . 4 . 3 - direct sale voucher 1997 
Croatia 70 3+ 4+ 3 . insider voucher 1995 
Czech Rep 80 4 . 4+ 3+ voucher direct sale 1992-94 
Estonia 80 4 . 4+ 4 - direct sale voucher 1994-95 
Hungary 80 4 . 4+ 4 - direct sale insider 1992-96 
Latvia 70 4 - 4+ 3 . direct sale voucher 1996-97 
Lithuania 75 4 . 4+ 3 . insider/voucher direct sale 1992-94 
Poland 75 4 - 4+ 4 - insider/voucher direct sale 1997 
Romania 70 4 - 4 - 3 - insider direct sale 1995 
Russia 65 3 . 4 . 2+ insider/voucher direct sale 1993-94 
Slovak R. 80 4 . 4+ 4 - direct sale voucher 1992-96 
Slovenia 70 3 . 4+ 3 . insider voucher 1995-96 
Ukraine 60 3 . 4 . 2+ insider direct sale 1998-99 
EBRD 2010 privatization-index: 1=no privatization, 4+=full privatization.         Method: own estimate 
 
A fast and comprehensive privatization is not sufficient for developing a system of efficient 
corporate governance. Also a well functioning state is necessary (see next section) and it is 
necessary to have strong institutions for securing property rights, a developed capital market, 
access to reliable information about enterprises for existing and potential investors, and well 
functioning bankruptcy procedures. There are many examples of fast and comprehensive 
privatization, which did not lead to efficient corporate governance:  
 
The main part of the large privatization in the Czech Republic was done through vouchers in the 
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period 1992-94. After the privatization rounds most of the assets were controlled by investment 
funds again controlled by the large banks. However, state ownership dominated most of these 
banks. Therefore, it could be questioned whether the assets were truly privatized. The main 
problem, however, was that the administrators of the investment funds had de facto control with 
the enterprises in their portfolio. The real owners who had invested their vouchers in the 
investment funds were outside influence. This gap between control on one side and the financial 
returns on the other gave the administrators the opportunity to exploit their position of control to 
tunnel values out of the enterprises to the benefit of other enterprises directly owned by them. 
Similar ways of inefficient corporate governance systems resulting in tunneling are also known 
from Russia and other economies in transition.  
 
7. The importance of a well functioning state 
Closely connected to the quality of corporate governance of the enterprises is the quality of the 
governance of the state. Clear and stable rules of the game are a must for a well functioning 
market economy. Here we can distinguish between the development of the political dimension - 
the development of democratic institutions - and the administrative dimension - the quality of the 
state bureaucracy closely connected to the economic institutions. The two dimensions support 
each other and there is a close connection between the development of democratic institutions 
and the progress in economic reforms (World Bank 2002). Figure 5 shows the relation between 
the development of democracy as measured by Freedom House on a scale from 1 (full 
democracy) to 7 (dictatorship) and an average of EBRD’s reform indicators from 4.33 (fully 
developed reforms) to 1 (no reforms). The numbers are based on 1999 and 2008 data. All 
countries have moved upward on the transition indicators, but the democracy indicators have 
fallen for Russia and Belarus, while improved for the other countries. In both points in time there 
is a clear correlation between democratic development and progress in reforms as indicated by 
the positive trend-lines. 
 
It is worth noting that a well functioning state is not the same as a “strong” state with the head of 
state in power for a long period. Stability of power is not a guarantee for a positive development. 
A “strong” state with lack of democratic institutions and lack of political competition means 
limited possibility for the opposition to criticize and challenge the current head of state. It is 
important that the government and the administration can be criticized and corrected. The old 
Soviet system was an example of a stable, but petrified state power, that lacked correction 
mechanisms and was not able to make the necessary flexible adjustments to exploit the 
opportunities of the technological development. 
 
A strong opposition performing a persistent and strong monitoring of both the political elite and 
of the administrative bureaucracy can unveil inefficiencies, corruption and abuse of power. The 
free press has an important role, but is it also important to have a well functioning legislative 
system with clear rules and consequent and fair implementation through an efficient and 
independent court system. Some Central European countries had an advantage in this respect 
because of their roots in a well functioning court system before World War 2. 
  
16 
 
  Figure 5  Democracy versus transition indicators 1999 and 2008 
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The EU-integration process supported the institutional development and made it possible to 
benchmark the quality of the democratic institutions and especially the administrative capacity of 
the state. This is another explanation why the best functioning transitional states are found among 
the new EU members. In the accession process the applicants had to strengthen the state 
functions such as a transparent and fairly implemented tax system, and efficient and fair 
regulation of enterprises e.g. in relation to environment and safety at the workplace. 
 
8. The dynamics of transition 
The gap in consumption level was an important trigger for the revolutionary change in Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union in 1989-91. After the transition the populations had high 
expectations about strong improvements of living standards. As shown in section 2 these 
expectations were not met. On the contrary, the big majority of the population faced steep 
decreases in real incomes during the first years of transition. At the same time a narrow elite had 
the opportunity to fill some of the many hole in the new market economy and they earned huge 
profits of being first movers in different fields. Others made fortunes by using their links to a 
corrupt state bureaucracy, by tunneling values from state owned firms or by getting assets in the 
privatization process much below their value. Thus, the inequality increased steeply in most 
transition countries – especially in the former Soviet Union and the Baltics while it stayed at a 
lower level in Central Europe – see Svejnar (2002) and EBRD 2007.  
 
This development caused a threat both to the democratic development and to the transition of 
economic institutions. In some countries we saw elements of a negative vicious circle in the 
dynamic linkages between the different elements of the PIE-model, see figure 6. 
 
As shown in table 1 all transition countries faced a steep fall in production in the early years. In 
nearly all countries this led to a political reaction among important social groups which were the 
losers in this process. In countries such as Lithuania, Poland, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria the 
elections in the early 1990es led directly to shifts in government back to parties related to the 
former communists. However, this did not directly imply a change in policy since in most 
countries these parties had changed to a Scandinavian style of Social Democratic parties. The 
exceptions were Russia and the Czech Republic where the communist parties continued their 
orthodox conservative policies, but here they did not manage to form governments.  
 
This means that there were no direct link from a popular reaction at the elections and a change in 
the policy although the government was changed back to left wing parties. In a country like 
Lithuania the old communist leader Brazauskas came back to power, but instead of rewinding the 
reforms process some of the reform elements were in fact strengthened and privatization was 
speeded up. Also in Poland the reforms were continued after the socialist party came back to 
power in 1991. 
 
However, in countries such as Russia, Ukraine, Romania and Bulgaria the reaction led to a 
slowdown in the reform process implying that the package of reforms did not pass the benchmark 
which could be called the critical mass of reforms – that is enough reforms to motivate enterprise 
managers to shift behavior to focus on market oriented adjustments e.g. by cutting costs and 
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adjusting their products to the preferences of the customers. If the reforms did not pass the 
critical mass of reforms the enterprise managers would continue to use most of their effort on 
getting support and good deals with the state bureaucracy, and by tunneling values from the 
enterprises. There were weak states in these countries with high level of corruption, no 
functioning rule of law, and high barriers for entrepreneurial initiative. The existing vested 
interests of the elite with strong connections between business and state exploited the  long period 
of halfhearted reforms to built up their fortunes e.g. by using loopholes like: dual prices, skewed 
privatizations, soft budgets, or direct tunneling of state assets. (Havrylyshyn & Odling-Smee 
2000) 
 
At the same time e.g. in Russia and Ukraine, the macroeconomic stabilization was quite weak in 
the first years. Halfhearted reforms and weak stabilization lead to negative results in the 
economy. Inflation continued on a high level for several years, existing companies made only 
little restructuring, and the entry of small new enterprises was low. This meant that the economy 
fell even deeper and the downturn continued for longer time as seen in table 1. In Russia the 
problems were made worse by lack of clarity about the political institutions which led to strong 
confrontations and a second round of violent fight around the parliament in the fall of 1993. 
Although the clarification of the political institutions and the introduction of a strong presidency 
like in US stabilized the political system it took some years and a deep economic crisis in Russia 
in 1998 before the economy stabilized and Putin strengthened the reform process so that Russia 
although reluctantly passed the critical mass of reforms in the early period of the new 
millennium. In the Caucasian area and on Balkan nationalist fights reinforced the vicious circle of 
economic break down and further escalating conflicts.  
 
However, this vicious circle was not the general experience in the Baltics and in Central Europe. 
Instead these economies went into much more positive reinforcing dynamics between the 
different elements in the PIE-model: 
 
In Estonia and Latvia the political reaction on the economic crisis were quite limited because the 
focus for politics was on the national problem related to the big Russian speaking minority. In 
other countries like Lithuania and Central Europe the new ruling Social Democratic parties 
continued the reform process. Therefore, they passed the critical mass of reforms already in the 
first half of the 1990es and the turn in production also happened quite fast. It has been argued 
(Balcerowicz 1994) that these countries to a high degree used the “window of opportunity” which 
was created because of the goodwill in the population toward the change first of all in the 
political system after the end of the Soviet occupation/dominance and the introduction of 
personal freedom. These advantages meant that the population was willing to accept some 
sacrifices at least for a certain period until the economy started to go up the J-curve. In this way 
they came into a virtuous circle of transition:   
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Figure 6 – Vicious and virtuous circle of transition 
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The most important elements of the liberalization and privatization package were implemented 
implying that the economic institutions passed the critical mass of reforms. Though the initial fall 
in production was unavoidable the economy turned around within 2-4 years and the positive 
elements of enterprise restructuring and start of new enterprises made the base for increasing 
productivity in the economy and increasing wages. This meant in general that the population 
continued to support market oriented reforms so there was backing behind deepening of the 
market institutions.  
 
At the same time most of these countries implemented a rather strict macroeconomic stabilization 
and the initial high inflation fell steeply. The exchange rate was stabilized. In fact in some 
countries fixed exchange rates or currency boards like in Estonia from 1992, Lithuania from 1994 
and Bulgaria from 1997 were important for the stabilization policy bringing down inflation. 
 
9. Restructuring of enterprises 
One of the most important problems of the command economy was the insufficient use of the 
human and technological resources to develop and produce competitive products. The main 
reason behind the steep fall in production at the beginning of transition was, as earlier mentioned, 
the gap between the production structure of the command economy and the new structure 
adjusted to the competitive market economy. This transition of production is directly linked to the 
restructuring of enterprises. The reactive restructuring, cutting away unprofitable production and 
cutting down the number of employees, was implemented in the first years of transition although 
it was implemented slower and less consequently in the CIS countries.  
 
Deep strategic restructuring means building up the new structure of production with 
development of new products, new production methods, new technology, retraining of the 
employees, implementation of new management methods, new structures of organization, new 
networks to suppliers, new marketing methods and new markets. Strategic restructuring takes a 
long time to implement and it demands large capital inputs. At the same time new management 
skills must be developed – training of old and new managers in strategy, accounting, marketing, 
organizational behavior etc. has been a persistent bottleneck in all countries in transition. 
 
Strategic restructuring is not only taking place in existing enterprises. Starting up new enterprises 
is a very important element in building up the new structure of production. This is especially 
important for sectors like trade and services, which had a low priority under the command 
economy. Closing down and/or breaking up old giant industrial enterprises and transfer of 
employees and physical assets to new enterprises is often the most efficient form of deep 
restructuring. The early success of the Polish economy is closely connected to the very dynamic 
development of new small and medium sized enterprises. The Polish privatization was rather 
slow, but new private enterprises contributed to fast growth in the private sector from the early 
start of the transition process. 
 
Bureaucratic barriers, lack of transparency in legislation, uncertainty in relation to more or less 
criminal networks, and uncertainty about the market development limited the possibilities and the 
dynamic development for small and medium sized enterprises in most CIS countries.  
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The societal framework including the quality of the state is a very important factor for strategic 
restructuring. At the same time corporate governance of enterprises plays a crucial role. It is 
important which groups take over the ownership of the enterprises in the privatization process 
and in the post privatization change of ownership structures. The privatization and lack of 
regulation of investment funds in the Czech Republic is an example of a bad corporate 
governance system, which for some years hampered the incentives for strategic restructuring. 
 
The Russian privatization has been criticized for the strong emphasis on insider-takeovers by 
management and broad groups of other employees. Experts have called this: “half privatization” 
and some evidence have been presented showing that insider owned enterprises have problems 
getting enough capital for restructuring. However, there is contradictory evidence showing that 
insider owned companies often perform better that outsider owned domestic enterprises (Mygind 
2000). The delay in restructuring in Russian enterprises can probably not be explained by the 
ownership structure. Instead, the unfavorable conditions in the institutional framework around the 
enterprises must be blamed. One of the leading economies in transition, Slovenia, with the 
highest GDP per capita in Eastern Europe, has a corporate governance system with many 
employee owned enterprises. Note, however, that there is quite clear evidence that enterprises 
owned by foreign core investors are in front concerning strategic restructuring. This will be 
further discussed in the following section. 
 
10. Foreign Direct Investment - importance and development  
The explanation behind the strong strategic restructuring in foreign owned enterprises is that 
foreign investors have strong advantages concerning access to capital, management expertise, 
new technology and international networks. Usually the foreign investor constitutes a strong core 
owner with a dominant share of ownership. This means that there are no corporate governance 
problems under the assumption that the overall institutional framework guarantees the property 
rights. The countries with the highest foreign direct investment per capita are characterized by 
advanced transition and a quite well functioning state with clear and transparent rules for 
enterprises and foreign investors. Czech, Hungary and Estonia are leading measured per capita. 
Already in the 1980es Hungary had opened up for foreign investments mostly in the form of joint 
ventures. The high level of foreign investments has been an important reason behind Hungary’s 
advanced development in relation to strategic restructuring and in relation to the development of 
a competitive industry. However, some evidence points in the direction that the technological and 
other positive spin-offs to the domestic part of the industry were rather modest (Hunya, 1997). 
The fall in FDI for some of the leading countries in the later years is because the acquisitions in 
relation to privatizations have ended. However, around the membership of the EU in 2004 FDI 
went up again in the accession countries. Also for Russia and Ukraine we see high inward FDI in 
the later years. Though, the financial crisis resulted in a steep fall in FDI in 2009. 
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Table 5 Foreign Direct Investment inflows per year 1990-2009 and stock 2009 
 19901991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2009 
                                                                                       millions USD                                  stock %GDP
Albania     20   68   53   70   90   48   45   41   144   206   135   178   346   264   325   662   988   979  3 537 28.7
Belarus   0   0   7   18   11   15   105   352   203   444   104   98   253   174   164   305   354  1785  2158  1863  8 457 17.2
Bulgaria   4   56   42   40   105   90   109   505   537   819 1002   813   905 2097  3452  3923  7507 12388 9795 4467 50 727 107.7
Croatia     13   144   114   108   493   541   941 1452 1051 1313 1071 1989  1179  1825  3468  5023  6140  2605 36 602 58.1
Czech R.   72  523  1003   653   868 2562 1428 1301 3718 6324 4985 5642 8482 2103  4974 11653  5463 10444  6451  2725  115 899 60.9
Estonia     82   163   217   202   151   266   573   303   392   540   289   928   958  2869  1797  2725  1726  1680 16 248 85.1
Hungary 554 1470 1477  2443 1143 5103 3300 4167 3335 3312 2764 3936 2994 2137  4506  7709 19802 71485 61993 - 5575 248 681 194.3
Latvia     32   45   214   180   382   521   357   348   413   132   253   304   637   707  1663  2 322  1261   72 11 726 44.8
Lithuania     10   31   31   73   152   354   926   486   379   446   725   180   774  1028  1817  2 015  1823   348  13 837 37.4
Poland   88  359   678  1715 1875 3659 4498 4908 6365 7270 9445 5701 4123 4588 12874 10293 19603 23561 14689 11395 182 799 42.5
Romania   0   40   77   94   341   419   263 1215 2031 1027 1057 1158 1141 2196  6436  6483 11367  9 921 13909  6 329 73 983 45.9
Russia    1161 1211   690  2066 2579 4865 2761 3309 2714 2748 3461 7958 15444 12886 29701 55073 75461 38722 252 456 20.3
Slovak R.   93   81   100   179   255  2587   370   231   725   428  1932  1584  4142  2160  3030  2429  4693  3581  3411 - 50  50 258 57.1
Slovenia   4   65   111   113   117   151   174   334   215   107   136   370  1659   302   831   577   648  1514  1924 - 67  15 237 31.4
Ukraine   0   0   200   200   159   267   521   623   743   496   595   792   693  1424  1715  7808  5604  9891  10913  4816 52 021 44.3
Based on UNCTAD (2010) – www.unctad.org 
 
Foreign investments are often motivated by access to the market of the host country. However, 
there is increasing weight on motives based on the exploitation of competitive factor inputs, 
especially the cheap highly qualified labor force (Meyer, 1998). Often the two motives are 
combined. The host country is an important market and at the same time the foreign investor uses 
the factors of production to build up exports to other Eastern European countries or to export 
back to the West. This means that in most cases there is a positive connection between foreign 
trade and FDI. 
 
Table 6 – Current account balances 1990-2009 (in per cent of GDP) 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Albania    -14.4 -7.2 -7.3 -11.5 -6.7 -7.6 -4.6 -7.4 -9.5 -7.0 -5.9 -8.7 -6.5 -10.6 -10.7 -14.0
Belarus    -11.9 -9.1 -4.4 -3.6 -6.1 -6.7 -1.6 -3.2 -3.3 -2.2 -2.4 -5.2 1.4 -3.9 -6.6 -7.0 -13.1
Bulgaria -8.2 -1.0 -4.2 -10.1 -0.3 -0.2 1.7 10.0 -0.5 -5.0 -5.6 -5.9 -2.0 -5.1 -6.8 -12.5 -17.9 -21.7 -21.2 -9.5
Croatia  -3.4 3.4 5.6 5.7 -7.7 -5.0 -12.6 -6.8 -7.7 -2.8 -3.7 -8.6 -7.2 -5.0 -6.3 -7.9 -8.6 -9.9 -5.3
Czech R.    1.3 -1.9 -2.6 -6.7 -6.3 -2.1 -2.4 -4.7 -5.3 -5.7 -6.3 -5.2 -1.6 -3.2 -2.6 -2.9
Estonia    1.3 -7.3 -4.4 -8.6 -11.4 -8.6 -4.4 -5.3 -5.2 -10.7 -11.4 -11.8 -9.9 -16.8 -18.0 -11.2 4.5
Hungary 0.4 0.8 0.9 -9.0 -5.6 -9.4 -4.0 -4.5 -7.2 -7.8 -8.4 -6.0 -7.0 7.9 -8.6 -7.6 -7.5 -6.4 -5.7 0.2
Latvia     5.5 -0.4 -4.9 -5.5 -9.7 -9.0 -4.7 -7.5 -6.7 -8.2 -12.8 -12.4 -22.7 -23.9 -12.1 8.6
Lithuania    -3.2 -2.2 -10.2 -8.8 -9.8 -11.6 -10.9 -5.9 -4.7 -5.2 -6.9 -7.7 -7.2 -10.8 -13.7 -13.9 4.2
Poland 1.0 -2.6 1.1 -0.7 0.7 4.5 -2.1 -3.7 -4.0 -7.4 -5.8 -2.8 -2.5 -2.1 -4.0 -1.2 -2.7 -4.1 -5.2 -1.7
Romania -9.6 -3.5 -8.0 -4.5 -1.4 -6.3 -7.3 -6.1 -6.9 -3.6 -3.6 -5.8 -3.4 -5.8 -8.4 -10.2 -11.8 -14.4 -13.3 -4.5
Russia     2.1 1.4 2.8 0.0 0.1 12.6 18.0 11.1 8.4 8.2 10.2 11.0 9.5 6.1 6.4 4.0
Slovakia    -4.7 4.6 2.1 -9.9 -9.1 -9.2 -5.3 -3.5 -8.3 -7.9 -5.9 -7.8 -8.5 -7.0 -5.3 -5.0 -3.2
Slovenia 3.0 1.0 7.4 1.5 4.0 -0.5 0.3 0.3 -0.7 -4.1 -3.2 0.2 1.1 -0.8 -2.7 -1.7 -2.6 -4.2 -3.6 -1.5
Ukraine     -3.1 -3.1 -2.7 2.7 -3.1 5.2 4.7 3.7 7.5 5.8 10.5 2.9 -1.5 -4.2 -6.5 -1.5
Based on EBRD-2000 and EBRD-2010  
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The balance of foreign trade and the current account has run through four different stages during 
the transition process: Immediately after opening up in early transition there was a huge inflow of 
Western goods based on pent up demand for these good which before were unavailable for the 
ordinary consumer. However, the steep devaluations of the currencies made imports relatively 
expensive and made important constraints on this kind of imports. The third stage is the long 
restructuring period when the transition countries have to import investment goods to build up 
their production capacity. Only gradually this has been reflected in increasing exports. This 
means that most East European countries have had huge deficits on trade and the current account. 
Only the strong commodity producers like Russia, Ukraine and some of the countries in Central 
Asia has had positive current accounts in the later years – see Figure 6. The steep contraction of 
demand following the financial crisis resulted in steep falling imports and trade surplus in e.g. the 
Baltic countries. 
 
11. The financial crisis and the effect on the countries in transition. 
As shown in the earlier sections the integration with the surrounding world has been an important 
part of the transition process. This has been directly related to the development in formal 
institutions – most markedly for the new EU member states, and in the restructuring of 
production, where the steeply increasing trade and FDI have played key-roles including the 
integration of the East European financial sectors with Western Europe. However, this 
development also meant that the transition countries were exposed to the risks following a 
recession in the global economy and especially in relation to their most important trade partners - 
the old members of EU. 
 
Using the PIE-terminology the main push comes from the surrounding world. However, the 
vulnerability of each country depends on their specific characteristics in relation to:  
 The development of institutions, the degree of openness to trade, FDI and especially to 
foreign ownership and international integration of the financial sector. 
 The stage of development in relation to restructuring foreign trade and competitiveness in 
the economy, including balance of trade and current account and foreign debt.  
 The stance of macro-economic stabilization and exchange rate regimes.  
 The resources in the economy, the dependency on the development in commodity prices. 
 In the longer run we may see political effects of the crisis. The question is to what extent 
the economic downturn may result in unrest and strong confrontations which may 
strengthen some more extreme political forces. 
 
Especially, the most advanced transition countries have had quite open economies with high 
foreign trade and high level of inward FDI. Still, nearly all the transition countries have a high 
trade deficit. They are as earlier described in the stage of strong restructuring where they need to 
import investment goods especially for implementing new technologies. This restructuring means 
steeply increasing productivity improvement in quality and competitiveness. Exports are 
increasing fast, however still not fast enough to cover imports. The trade and current account 
deficits have been covered by FDI and foreign debt, but this external financing means that an 
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increasing part of income shall be paid in interest and returns to foreign owners. These transfers 
have not been an important burden for these economies in the economic boom in the later years. 
Interest rates have been low, refinancing easy, and the returns on FDI have typical been retained 
in the host countries, thus, counting as additional FDI. The expectations were that in the long run 
the balance would be reestablished by further restructuring resulting in higher competitiveness 
and increasing exports. However, when demand fell because of the global recession exports were 
strongly hurt. At the same time FDI also fell steeply. This meant that financing the current 
account deficit became a problem and several countries were forced to cut down domestic 
demand to lower imports. 
 
Few banks in Eastern Europe and Russia have been directly hit by the sub-prime defaults which 
triggered the financial crisis, but because of the credit crunch refinancing of foreign debt became 
more difficult and more expensive. The development of the financial sector were an important 
part of the latest stage of transition, and especially in some countries like the Baltics, Romania, 
Bulgaria, Russia and Ukraine there was a strong credit boom in the later years.  
 
In Russia the banks were owned by domestic capital and after the 1998 crisis the dominating 
banks were state-owned. This was not the case in Eastern Europe where most banks were owned 
by Western banks. The Western owners in general supported their subsidiaries, which often 
belong to the most profitable parts of their networks (EBRD 2008). However, there was a risk 
that losses in the mother banks led to cuts or a stricter credit policy in the subsidiaries and in 
general the flows of credits to Eastern Europe were restricted and made more short term because 
of the crisis. 
 
In the Baltic countries with fixed exchange rates/currency boards domestic interest rates were 
nearly down at the Euro level and a high proportion of the loans were taken directly in Euro. At 
the same time catching up of productivity and production meant a gradual catching up of price 
levels and thus higher inflation (Mygind 2006).  
 
The credit boom triggered a boom in the real estate sector building up a housing price bubble and 
this was an important reason for increasing pressures on the labor market. Unemployment fell to 
very low levels and wages increased steeply causing further pressures on inflation. This meant 
that the nominal interest rates did not follow the increase in prices and became lower than 
inflation. This negative real interest rate increased further the incentives to take loans. The credit 
boom was accommodated by the foreign owned banks which supplied the economies with cheap 
loans. In this way there was a self-enforcing dynamic circle within the economic system which 
led to further overheating.  
 
For some years the Baltic economies had record high growth rates, but the boom was 
accompanied with increasing inflation and very high current account deficits. This was not 
sustainable in the longer run and already before the melt down on the global capital markets the 
Baltic economies experienced an economic turn-around and their crisis were further deepened 
after the global melt down in the fall of 2008. Especially, the Latvian economy was vulnerable 
because of some years with quite loose fiscal policies and high increases in wages and prices. 
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One of the biggest banks was rescued by the state and IMF had to step in with a big loan 
conditioned by a tough fiscal package including direct cuts in public wages. This saved the fixed 
exchange rate which was part of the Latvian entry plan for the Euro, but at the same time 
production fell further. 
 
Also Hungary had to implement an austerity package to get an emergency loan from IMF and 
ECB – the European Central Bank to protect the economy from a full melt down. Unlike the 
Baltics, Hungary had a floating exchange rate. Still, Euro loans made up a substantial part of 
many Hungarians’ loans. With steep falls in the Hungarian currency this debt burden increased 
considerably and threatened a further break down of the economy. In this way several countries 
like Hungary and Latvia had to tighten their economic policies in a period where the fall in 
demand called for economic stimulus and the crisis was deepened in the short run. 
 
Commodity producers such as Russia had benefitted from the high and increasing prices on oil, 
gas and metals for several years. They had high trade and current account surpluses, and in 
Russia they accumulated huge reserves from oil tax revenues in a stabilization fund. This turned 
out to be a prudent policy when the commodity prices collapsed in the fall of 2008. The 
development showed the Russian dependency on high oil prices. The Russian stock market 
experienced one of the steepest fall and there were increasing pressure on the Ruble which 
depreciated by more than 30%. At the same time the Russian state had to inject high amounts of 
capital into the financial sector like it was done in many countries in the West.  
 
With the revival of the global economy in 2010 nearly all transition countries turned to positive 
growth rates after. The crisis meant a set back in growth; but these economies have a high 
potential for high growth rates in their continuing restructuring process which within a period of 
the next 20 years may lead to a catch up to the average EU level. The speed of this catch up 
process depends on the final stages of transition and their ability to consolidate their institutional 
development. The current crisis has also pointed to weaknesses in some of the transition countries 
like: dependency on commodity prices, dependency on cheap credits, weak states with high 
corruption and lacking quality of institutions. This will be further discussed in the final section on 
the status of the transition process. 
 
12. Status and perspectives for the remaining transition process 
Has the transition been too tough? Because of the drastic fall in production and living standards 
the first answer could be yes. However, there is much variation in the development of production 
for different countries. The evidence shows that the most consequent reformers have been most 
successful. The majority of the population in these countries has now living conditions at least as 
good as before the transition started. This level has been reached after a tough period with high 
costs for many groups such as retired people, most employees in the public sector, workers in 
large failing enterprises etc. Many mistakes have been made and a few countries are still below 
the starting point. 
 
Reforms must be adjusted to the specific conditions in each country. But this argument has often 
been used as an excuse for slow and inconsistent reforms. It is hardly too tough policies, but 
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hesitant and contradictory reforms combined with a badly functioning state, which is to blame for 
the lacking, or hopefully postponed, success in several countries. There is a close connection 
between the success of the reforms, the quality of the state and foreign investments and opening 
toward the developed market in Western Europe. The countries most advanced in the transition 
process are also the countries most advanced in the integration process with EU and they also 
have the highest level of foreign investments.  Foreign direct investment plays an important role 
in the current stage of transition with focus on restructuring at the enterprise level. 
 
These elements points toward the future transition with further integration with Western Europe 
and further restructuring of enterprises and integration into international production networks. 
There is still some potential in restructuring production also in the most advanced transitional 
countries. Even though these countries have an educational level comparable to most EU 
countries they still need to invest a lot of capital in infrastructure and a new restructured 
production base. The qualifications of the labor force must be further adjusted to the new needs. 
Further development of institutions is crucial especially concerning financial markets, the court 
system and the development of the administrative capacity of the state. 
 
In the coming years we will probably see an extension of the gap in Eastern Europe between 
groups of countries with different speeds in relation to transition and EU-integration. In the 
frontline we have Estonia, Poland, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary closely 
followed by Latvia and Lithuania and then Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia, while the remaining 
countries in the Balkans come in the second row. The CIS countries with Russia in front have a 
more uncertain future and a more peripheral participation in the integration process. Decisive for 
Russia and other CIS countries is the development of the state. Will they succeed in building up a 
well functioning democracy with a critical opposition and an independent free press, which can 
criticize the people in power and present alternatives to corruption and abuse of power? Will they 
succeed in building up an administrative capacity, which can assure clear, stable and fair rules for 
enterprises?  
 
The economic slowdown following the financial crisis has hurt the transition countries mainly 
because they are highly dependent on the Western markets for their steeply increasing exports 
and dependent on external finance for some of their investment in restructuring production. At 
the same time the cooling of the economy with falling commodity prices has relaxed the 
inflationary pressure, which especially hit the overheated Baltic economies. This fall in inflation 
in fact opened a window of opportunity in relation to Euro accession for Estonia in January 2011. 
With proper policies and with further upgrading of the quality of institutions and of the 
functioning of the state bureaucracy there should be good prospects for succeeding in the long 
catching up process with Western Europe within the next 20 years. 
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